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ABSTRACT 
 
Development of a Safeguards Approach for a Small Graphite Moderated Reactor and 
Associated Fuel Cycle Facilities. (May 2009) 
Eric Benton Rauch, B.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. William S. Charlton 
 
 Small graphite-moderated and gas-cooled reactors have been around since the 
beginning of the atomic age.  Though their existence in the past has been associated with 
nuclear weapons programs, they are capable of being used in civilian power programs.  
The simpler design constraints associated with this type of reactor would make them 
ideal for developing nations to bolster their electricity generation and help promote a 
greater standard of living in those nations.  However, the same benefits that make this 
type of reactor desirable also make it suspicious to the international community as a 
possible means to shorten that state‟s nuclear latency.  If a safeguards approach could be 
developed for a fuel cycle featuring one of these reactors, it would ease the tension 
surrounding their existence and possibly lead to an increased latency through engineered 
barriers. 
 The development of this safeguards approach follows a six step procedure.  First, 
the fuel cycle was analyzed for the types of facilities found in it and how nuclear 
material flows between facilities.  The goals of the safeguards system were established 
next, using the normal IAEA standards for the non-detection and false alarm 
probabilities.  The 5 MWe Reactor was modeled for both plutonium production and 
maximum power capacity.  Each facility was analyzed for material throughput and the 
processes that occur in each facility were researched.  Through those processes, 
diversion pathways were developed to test the proposed safeguards system.  Finally, 
each facility was divided into material balance areas and a traditional nuclear material 
accountancy system was set up to meet the established safeguards goals for the facility. 
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The DPRK weapons program is a great example of the type of fuel cycle that is 
the problem.  The three major facilities in the fuel cycle, the Fuel Fabrication Facility, 
the 5 MWe Reactor, and the Radiochemical Laboratory, can achieve the two goals of 
safeguards using traditional methods.  Each facility can be adequately safeguarded using 
methods and practices that are relatively inexpensive and can obtain material balance 
periods close to the timeliness limits set forth by the IAEA.  The Fuel Fabrication 
Facility can be safeguarded at both its current needed capacity and its full design 
capacity using inexpensive measurements.  The material balance period needed for both 
capacities are reasonable.  For the 5 MWe reactor, plutonium production is simulated to 
be 6.7 kg per year and is on the high side of estimates.  The Radiochemical Laboratory 
can also be safeguarded at its current capacity.  In fact, the timeliness goal for the facility 
dictates what the material balance period must be for the chosen set of detectors which 
make it very reasonable. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Small graphite-moderated and gas-cooled reactors have posed a proliferation risk 
for many years.
 (1)
  These reactors have been around since the beginning of the atomic 
age and are direct descendents from the first reactor ever built: the Chicago Pile-1 
designed by Enrico Fermi during the Manhattan Project.  Besides the Calder Hall style 
reactors in the United Kingdom and the Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor systems in 
Germany, this reactor type has primarily been used for plutonium production for military 
purposes.  Due to this fact, there has been little effort put forth to devise a system of 
safeguards for this reactor system and the international community has avoided building 
them because their existence would inherently suggest a nuclear weapons program.  
These reactors are relatively easy to build, have simplified engineering needs, can use 
natural uranium as fuel and normally have low burnup which allows them to be almost 
perfect candidates for a covert plutonium production program.   
 There are, however, several peaceful and legitimate purposes for these systems if 
they could be properly and responsibly safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA).  As part of a nation‟s electrical power strategy, these small reactors 
could be used to better the standard of living in developing countries as well as provide 
cheap, reliable electricity and heat to rural communities.  As with most technologies that 
start out in a weapons development project, the potential for misuse is present, with the 
most notable example of misuse coming from the Democratic People‟s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK).  However, there are no technical barriers that prevent such a system 
from being reliably safeguarded under either an INFCIRC-153 or INFCIRC-540 type 
agreement.
 (2) (3)
  If a safeguards approach for a small graphite-moderated and gas-cooled  
____________ 
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reactor with associated fuel cycle facilities could be developed and demonstrated to meet 
the timeliness goals of the IAEA it could allow the IAEA to focus better on those areas 
requiring greatest attention. 
 A fuel cycle featuring a graphite moderated reactor is likely to be more common 
in the future because a few of the designs being considered for the next generation of 
reactors are graphite moderated.
 (4)
  They have some key benefits that currently marketed 
light-water reactors do not have.  These benefits include lower power output which 
could be suitable for less developed electrical grids, simpler engineering and material 
needs, and the ability to forego an enrichment program to produce fuel for the reactors.  
However, these reactors typically have low maximum burnups which results in 
producing plutonium more suitable for weapons fabrication than traditional light water 
reactors.  For weapons purposes, having a high 
239
Pu to 
240
Pu ratio is desired due to the 
larger probability of fission per capture in 
239
Pu and a high spontaneous fission rate in 
240
Pu.  
239
Pu is produced by the absorption of a neutron in 
238
U which will beta decay 
twice to 
239
Pu.  
240
Pu is produced by a subsequent neutron absorption in 
239
Pu through a 
radiative capture reaction.  A general build up and decay scheme for 
238
U is shown in 
Fig. 1.  As the fuel continues to be irradiated, more 
239
Pu is produced from 
238
U; 
however, the rate of 
240
Pu production increases faster than the rate of 
239
Pu production.  
Therefore, at higher burnups the 
240
Pu content grows to what might be unacceptably high 
contents for weapons purposes.  Thus, systems that are well suited for plutonium 
production are those with high loadings of 
238
U and low discharge burnups.  Both of 
these facts are present in the operating conditions found in graphite-moderated reactors. 
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Fig. 1: Production of Plutonium from Uranium-238 
 
Unlike light-water moderated reactors, graphite-moderated reactors can reach 
criticality using natural uranium which is over 99% 
238
U.
 (5)
  Natural uranium fuel is 
normally limited to very low burnups due to criticality constraints.  Combined, those 2 
facts make any graphite-moderated reactor program suspicious to the international 
community.   
To alleviate concerns in the international community over programs involving 
graphite moderated reactors, steps could be taken by a state to lengthen their nuclear 
latency.  Nuclear latency can be defined as the effective time required by a state to 
produce a conventionally deliverable nuclear explosive device.  One step that would 
increase a state‟s latency and increase the probability of detection of proliferation is the 
implementation of a rigorous safeguards regime. 
 
B. General Nuclear Fuel Cycles 
 
Most fuel cycles require 3-4 stages, depending on the goals that the fuel cycle is 
designed to meet.  First, raw material must be processed into a suitable fuel.  Depending 
on the type of reactor, the amount of 
235
U might have to be enriched to achieve a critical 
system.  That uranium is then formed into a chemical composition that is specific to the 
type of reactor it will be burned in.  That uranium is then formed into the fuel shape, 
normally rods or pellets, and encased in a cladding.  The fuel is then burned in the 
reactor, where uranium is fissioned to release thermal energy.  Each fission also releases 
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a few neutrons which cause further fissions as well as transmutation of other isotopes 
inside the core.
 (6)
  The most important reaction for safeguards designers is the 
production of 
239
Pu through the absorption of a neutron in 
238
U and two subsequent beta 
decays.  The uranium fuel is burned in the reactor for a certain amount of time, which 
causes the fuel to have a specific burnup.  Burnup is a term that describes how much 
energy has been released per mass of fuel and is normally given in the units of 
megawatt-thermal-days per metric ton of initial heavy metal, in most reactors the heavy 
metal is uranium.
 (7)
  The fuel is removed from the reactor and allowed to cool.  About 
6% of the total core thermal power is still being produced in the spent fuel due to fission 
product decay.
 (8)
  Most fuel cycles allow the fuel to cool in a pool of water for a varying 
amount of time from a few months to a few years.  Some fuel cycles then store this spent 
fuel as is, without reprocessing it.  However, most of the fuel cycles in the world do 
include reprocessing of the spent fuel to recover plutonium and/or uranium for future 
uses.  In this reprocessing, the fuel is most often chemically separated into 3 or more 
streams, one that produces separated and purified uranium, another one with separated 
and purified plutonium, and the last is everything else which includes fission products 
and trans uranic elements.  The Pu-U-Recovery-EXtraction (PUREX) process is the 
most commonly used process in the world for reprocessing. 
After the fuel cycle has been properly mapped, the throughput of each facility 
must be analyzed to determine the material flow through the cycle.  The amount, form, 
and chemical transformations of the material is a very important piece of information 
needed to adequately design safeguards to detect diversion of material.  There are three 
stages in the fuel cycle: fuel fabrication, transmutation, and post-transmutation.  Each 
stage could be made up of several facilities depending on the fuel cycle.  For example, 
the fuel fabrication stage could consist of mining and milling facilities, an enrichment 
facility, and a fuel fabrication facility.  But not all fuel cycles require an enrichment 
facility, so the constituent facilities can change based on the needs and design of the 
entire fuel cycle.   
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C. The History of Applying Safeguards 
 
 Shortly after World War II and the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the 
non-proliferation movement began.  It was evident that weapons with such power must 
be controlled and the ability to produce them must be carefully monitored.  Beginning in 
the 1950‟s, the first steps toward stopping other countries from developing the 
technology to produce nuclear weapons were made.  The IAEA was formed by the 
United Nations (UN) in 1957 and was tasked to safeguard nuclear materials in facilities 
that were placed under its monitoring by member nations.
 (9)
  The scope of IAEA 
agreements was much smaller at first, as any inspections conducted by the new agency 
had to have a 1 week warning.  Only reactors above 100 MW(th) would be subject to 
safeguards.
 (9)
  Eventually, the first step towards fuel cycle safeguards was taken with 
INFCIRC-66/rev.2 in 1967, which included provisions for all of the common fuel cycle 
facilities: fuel fabrication, reactors of all sizes, and reprocessing facilities.
 (10)
  With this 
model in place, the attention of the international community became focused on the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is now the single most adopted treaty in the 
world.   
 The NPT was an agreement that limited the spread of nuclear weapons among 
member nations with the promise that those who forego weapons programs will benefit 
from the technical expertise of the weapons states in building civilian nuclear energy 
infrastructure.  The non-weapons states must complete a safeguards agreement with the 
IAEA after signing the treaty that will allow for transparency in the fuel cycles of 
member states.  The weapons states are also expected to eliminate their own nuclear 
weapons in the future.  The weapons states are the 5 nations who had nuclear weapons 
prior to the date of enforcement in 1970: the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet 
Union (now the obligations are assumed by Russia), People‟s Republic of China, and 
France. 
 The model proposed in INFCIRC-66/rev.2 provided the basic foundations used 
for the next quarter century.  Eventually, uranium enrichment facilities were also 
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covered under safeguards agreements, as that type of facility was brought online in non-
weapons states.  The tenets of INFCIRC-66/rev.2 were folded into INFCIRC-153 in 
1972 to become a package of safeguards on all nuclear material instead of a menu of 
potential safeguards, which INFCIRC-66/rev.2 was.
 (2)
   
INFCIRC-153 stood as the primary safeguards approach until after the first Gulf 
War in 1991, when Iraq‟s clandestine nuclear weapons program came to light.  The 
extent of the program had been vastly underestimated, and the ability of the IAEA to 
guarantee that no nuclear material was being used in a weapons program was put in 
doubt.  The next year, the DPRK submitted its initial declaration to the IAEA.  The 
IAEA had difficulty confirming the completeness and the correctness of the declaration.
 
(11)
  Both of these crises showed flaws in the IAEA system for detecting covert nuclear 
programs.  The IAEA sought to increase its effectiveness INFCIRC-540, more 
commonly called the Model Protocol or Additional Protocol.
 (3)
  The Additional Protocol 
had provisions for the IAEA to demand special inspections of facilities not covered in a 
state‟s declaration, broadened the right of the IAEA to order surprise inspections, and 
allowed member nations to share intelligence about other state‟s programs with the 
IAEA in an effort to stop the types of programs in Iraq and the DPRK before they 
became so advanced.  The Additional Protocol signified a significant shift in the IAEA‟s 
dealing with member nations.  Instead of verifying only declared activities, the IAEA 
would now be trying to detect any covert nuclear activities, even those completely 
separate from a declared program.
 (9)
  The Additional Protocol is the current set of goals 
the IAEA operates under.  Any new safeguards agreement with a country will be of 
INFCIRC-540 type and will include the right of the IAEA to inspect facilities not 
declared by the country.   
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D. Nuclear Safeguards 
 
 Nuclear material safeguards is an internationally recognized and implemented 
system for detecting and deterring proliferation by states without nuclear weapons.  The 
objectives of any IAEA safeguards system are twofold: 
1. Timely detection of a diversion of a significant quantity of special nuclear 
material from a declared facility. 
2. Timely detection of undeclared production of special nuclear material from 
undeclared facilities. 
There are six major steps in developing a safeguards regime. 
1. Research the fuel cycle in question to understand what facilities are included and 
what the relationships between facilities are. 
2. Establish the safeguards goals for the fuel cycle. 
3. Model the reactor(s) to determine their plutonium production and uranium 
consumption as a function of burnup and to determine their maximum safe 
power. 
4. Analyze the facilities in the fuel cycle for material throughput and to understand 
the types of processes that occur at each facility. 
5. Assess proliferation pathways through each facility and determine where a 
measurement could detect diversion.  Design a system of measurement devices 
that will detect diversion of a significant quantity of material in a timely manner. 
6. Perform an uncertainty analysis on the proposed system of measurements to 
determine the uncertainty in the material unaccounted for (MUF) and that they 
system can reliably meet the defined safeguards goals.   
These six steps allow for the generation of a safeguards regime that is specific to a 
particular fuel cycle. 
 The first step in designing any safeguards regime is to determine what facilities 
are currently in the fuel cycle, what their responsibilities are to the fuel cycle and what 
their throughput is.  Typically this information would be reported by the state to the 
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IAEA; however it can also be obtained through many sources, including non-
governmental entities [like the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)], 
the IAEA, or reports generated for the United States Government.  It is important to 
generate as full an understanding as possible about the way in which the facilities that 
make up the fuel cycle process and produce fissile material.  
 The next step in designing a safeguards regime is to state the goals for the 
regime.  The goals are normally defined in terms of a goal quantity, a timeliness goal for 
the detection of a goal quantity sized diversion, a non-detection probability, and a false 
alarm probability.  The IAEA has defined the first two and they are broken down into 
categories.  For the goal quantity, the IAEA has defined a set of Significant Quantities 
(SQ) based on the type of material in question.  These values are derived from the 
amount of material that would probably be needed by any state to make a nuclear device: 
 1 SQ of material = 
o 8 kg of Pu or 233U 
o 25 kg of 235U in HEU (235U enrichment > 20%) 
o 75 kg of 235U in LEU/NU/DU (235U enrichment < 20%). 
The timeliness goals are also broken down into categories based off of the time it would 
take to form the material into a device: 
 Timeliness Goal = 
o Un-irradiated, Direct Use material = 1 month 
o Irradiated, Direct Use material = 3 months 
o Indirect Use material = 1 year 
Direct use materials are also defined as materials that are suitable for weapons making 
purposes like Pu, 
233
U, or HEU.  Indirect use materials are defined as materials that can 
be used to create direct use materials like LEU, NU, and DU.
 (12)
 
 The false alarm probability (α) and the non-detection probability (β) are derived 
from a statistical analysis of a measurement system.  α is defined as the probability that 
the system will alarm given that no diversion has occurred and β is the probability that 
the system will not alarm given that a diversion has occurred.  Any measurement will 
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have an uncertainty associated with it.  That uncertainty can be assumed to have a 
normal distribution around the true value of the measurement.  In the design of the 
safeguards regime, α and β are set at a value determined by the designer.  In Fig. 2, a 
threshold, S, is selected where any value above that threshold will alarm the system and 
any value below will not.  α is the area under the No Diversion curve to the right of the 
alarm threshold, and β is the area under the Diversion curve to the left of the alarm 
threshold.  The threshold, S, can be moved to achieve different α‟s and β‟s.  Also, the 
uncertainties of the measurements can be changed through the use of different detectors, 
which would cause the curves to change their standard deviation which would change α 
and β at the same threshold. (13) 
 
 
Fig. 2: Selecting the Alarm Threshold 
 
 By selecting α and β, the alarm threshold can be set.  The goals the IAEA has set 
for most safeguards regimes 5% for both α and β.  This can be translated into an amount 
of uncertainty that the MUF can have to achieve the stated safeguards goals.  That 
amount for α and β set to 5% is 3σMUF < 1 SQ of material.  Therefore, the alarm 
threshold is normally set for 1/3 of the SQ material in question. 
 Concurrently with the analysis of the fuel cycle facilities will be modeling of the 
reactors to get an estimate of the plutonium production and overall performance of the 
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reactor.  Most reactor analysis codes do a fair job of analyzing the reactor neutronics, 
and they can be used to estimate the plutonium production of a particular reactor.  
However, that estimate is normally ± 5-25%, which means large fuel cycles cannot use 
this estimate in a material accountancy program.
 (14)
  It is also important to model the 
thermodynamic cycle of the reactor to understand what its thermal limits are.  Plutonium 
production is influenced by reactor power which is primarily limited by the materials 
used in the construction of the reactor.  The main issues to consider are the melting of 
the fuel and failing temperature of the cladding, though other safety characteristics like 
departure of nucleate boiling could be used as a limiting factor depending on reactor 
type.
 (8)
   
 After the fuel cycle has been mapped and each facility inside it has been 
examined for throughput and process, the facilities in the fuel cycle must be analyzed for 
proliferation pathways.  Proliferation pathways are defined as the means by which fissile 
material can be taken out of the fuel cycle and used for other purposes.  The methods 
and targeted material will change at each stop in the fuel cycle, but the goal is the same, 
to determine where the material is at the most risk for being diverted.  Once these 
pathways have been analyzed, the fuel cycle should be analyzed for key points where a 
particular measurement can detect a diversion of a significant quantity of material.  
These key measurement points will make up the basis of the safeguards approach. 
 The system of measurements will have an uncertainty associated with it.  By 
knowing the throughput of material and the uncertainty of the measurements within the 
system, an amount of MUF can be calculated.  The uncertainty of the MUF should meet 
the IAEA‟s timeliness goals for fissile material. 
 
E. Overview of Work 
 
 The expansion of nuclear power will spread both the benefits and problems 
associated with its use, and in order to enjoy the benefits a state must be ready and 
willing to tackle the problems that nuclear energy will present.  Beyond the technical 
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challenges associated with developing a nuclear energy infrastructure, the special 
circumstances regarding dual use technologies and their consequences if misused or 
abused by malefactors require vigilance by the international community to deter and 
detect any such misuse.  The next generation of reactors that will power many countries 
through the 21
st
 century will feature designs and materials that have not been popular 
previously.  Graphite moderated reactors will likely be part of the new generation, and 
therefore work must be done now to prepare for those reactors coming online.   
 As reactors spread to more nations and become more abundant, the need for 
assurances that this technology cannot be used for weapons purposes grows.  
Successfully proving that a small to medium sized fuel cycle featuring a graphite 
moderated reactor can be safeguarded would open up their use to developing nations.  In 
order to prove that safeguarding such a fuel cycle is possible, the first step is to choose a 
test case that can be adequately modeled and simulated.  In the simulation, add the 
appropriate safeguards and determine if the traditional method of safeguards 
implementation will meet the traditional safeguards goals.  For this work, the fuel cycle 
at the Yongbyon complex in the DPRK was chosen.  
 There are several reasons why the DPRK fuel cycle was chosen.  First, it features 
three key facilities present in most fuel cycles: fuel fabrication, reactor, and 
reprocessing.  All of these facilities are co-located in Yongbyon.  The fuel fabrication 
and reprocessing facilities were designed to accommodate a much larger fuel cycle, 
which allows for larger capacity facilities to also be modeled through this fuel cycle.  
The fuel cycle‟s of developing countries would also share many characteristics of this 
fuel cycle; such as overall power output, amount of material needed to sustain operation, 
and amount of production of special nuclear material.  Finally, the open source literature 
on this fuel cycle contains many details that further increase the accuracy of the model as 
well as serves as a check on the data the model provides.  
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CHAPTER II 
HISTORY AND TECHNICAL DETAILS OF THE MAJOR FACILITIES AT 
YONGBYON 
 
 The Yongbyon complex is a series of facilities that comprise the bulk of the 
nuclear infrastructure inside of the DPRK.  This complex is the primary research site for 
the entire nuclear program for the DPRK.  There are three major facilities located here, 
and these are the three facilities that are the focus of the test case.  Those facilities are 
the Fuel Fabrication Facility, the 5 MWe Reactor, and the Radiochemical Laboratory.  
The Yongbyon complex is located approximately 100 km north of Pyongyang.
 (11)
 Fig. 3 
and Fig. 4 are a map of Yongbyon and a satellite photo, respectively.  As can be seen, 
the complex is intertwined with the Kuryong River.  The Yongbyon complex forms a 
reasonably self-contained fuel cycle with both a front-end and back-end.  Thus, it is a 
useful test case for exploring safeguards approaches for generally collocated facilities.  
The history and technical details of these facilities will be given in this chapter. 
 The planned purpose for the Yongbyon complex was to provide support for a 
series of production reactors.  The 5 MWe Reactor was built first as a test reactor and for 
instruction on reactor operation.  The Fuel Fabrication Facility and Radiochemical 
Laboratory were constructed to support the other planned reactors, and due to that, they 
both have higher capacities than the needs of the 5 MWe Reactor alone.  Two more 
reactors, named the 50 MWe Reactor and the 200 MWe Reactor, were planned but never 
finished.  These reactors would have been designed similar to the 5 MWe, with larger 
sizes to produce larger power output.  Fig. 2 shows the location of the 50 MWe reactor 
site, but the 200 MWe reactor was planned for another location outside of Yongbyon.  
Fig. 2 also shows the location of the reactor supplied by the former USSR, the IRT-
2000. 
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Fig. 3: Map of Yongbyon Facility 
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Fig. 4: Satellite View of Yongbyon 
 
A. The History of the DPRK Weapons Program 
 
The Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea has been pursuing the capability of 
producing nuclear weapons since the 1960‟s.  The first efforts in this program were 
started under the supervision of the U.S.S.R. which provided a small research reactor in 
1965 under a nuclear cooperation treaty signed in 1959.   This reactor, known as the 
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IRT-2M (not shown on photo), was installed as a 2 MW(th) research reactor and was 
placed at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Facility.  The IRT was originally fueled by 
10% enriched fuel, but in 1974 was modified to use 80% enriched fuel and produce 4 
MW(th) and later to 8 MW(th) in the 1980‟s. (11)  The DPRK joined the IAEA in 1974 
and the IRT was then placed under IAEA safeguards in 1977 after being pressured from 
the Soviet Union.  The IRT was the training reactor with which North Korean scientists 
learned how to operate a reactor.  Under supervision from Chinese nuclear specialists, 
North Korean scientists began to learn how to manage a reactor and the facilities 
associated with it.   
Beginning in 1975, the first steps toward a full weapons program were initiated 
with the Isotope Production Facility.  This facility successfully reprocessed natural 
uranium targets irradiated in the IRT and produced approximately 300 mg of plutonium 
according to the declaration given by the DPRK.
 (11)
  The Isotope Production Facility 
was a lab-scale reprocessing facility designed to test the PUREX method for obtaining 
plutonium from spent nuclear fuel.  It consisted of a handful of hot-cells.  This capability 
gave the DPRK experience in both operating reactors and reprocessing spent fuel.  The 
plan for a much larger fuel cycle began to take shape.   
The planned fuel cycle has everything that would be needed for production of 
plutonium through the use of 3 reactors.   The Fuel Fabrication Facility was designed to 
accommodate the 5, 50, and 200 MWe Reactors, and the Radiochemical Laboratory able 
to accommodate at least the 5 and 50 MWe Reactors. The components of that plan are 
shown in Fig. 5. 
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Fig. 5: Planned Fuel Cycle 
  
Construction began on the 5 MWe Reactor in 1980, and it was completed in 
1986.
 (11)
  The design of the reactor is similar to the Calder Hall reactor of Great Britain.  
This Magnox-style reactor is graphite-moderated, CO2 cooled, and designed for a 
maximum of 20 MW(th) output.
 (11)
  It uses natural uranium, so no enrichment 
capabilities are needed to produce fuel for it indigenously.  The specifications for the 
reactor core, fuel rods, and control rods can be found in Table 1. 
 17 
 
Table 1: 5 MWe Characteristics 
Thermal Power 20 MWth 
Electrical capacity 5 MWe 
Initial U Loading 50 MTU 
Fuel Channels 812 
Fuel Rods per Channel 10 
Channel Center Pitch 20 cm 
Effective Core Height 590 cm 
Effective Core Diameter 643 cm 
Diameter of Fuel Channel 6.5 cm 
Fuel Composition U - 0.5% Al 
U Slug Diameter 2.9 cm 
U Slug Length 52 cm 
U Slug Mass 6.242 kg 
Cladding and Fin Composition Mg - 0.5% Zr 
Cladding Outside Diameter 3 cm 
Fin Diameter 5 cm 
Overall Length one Fuel Pin 60 cm 
Number of Control Rod Channels 44 
Diameter of Control Rod Channel 6.5 cm 
Control Rod Composition B4C 
Control Rod Length 520 cm 
Coolant CO2 
Reactor Inlet Temp 200 C 
Reactor Outlet Temp 360 C 
   
A full scale reprocessing plant was then constructed, giving the Yongbyon 
facility an industrial size facility to reprocess all of the spent fuel from the 5 MWe and 
the planned 50 and 200 MWe reactors.  A fuel fabrication plant capable of producing 
enough fuel for both the 5 MWe and 50 MWe annually was also constructed during this 
time.   
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A.1.  Standoff and Special Inspections 
 
 After the DPRK signed the NPT in 1985 at the behest of the USSR, it produced a 
declaration of its nuclear facilities and previous activities in 1992.
 (15)
  Normally reports 
are due to the IAEA within 18 months of signing the NPT; however, the DPRK took 
longer.  In the report, the DPRK claimed to have separated less than 100g of plutonium 
from ruptured fuel rods removed from the 5 MWe reactor along with around 300 mg 
from the IRT.  The declaration said that 76 rods were taken from the 5 MWe reactor and 
replaced.  Those spent fuel rods were added to 172 fresh fuel rods to run a hot test of the 
Radiochemical Laboratory.  From this hot test, the DPRK declared it recovered about 
62g of plutonium with about 2.4% 
240
Pu content.  They had calculated that the rods had 
around 90g of plutonium within them before the campaign, and the difference was 
considered as lost.
 (11) 
 Inconsistencies started to emerge after the IAEA analyzed swipe samples from 
around the Radiochemical Laboratory and other samples taken from the declared waste 
and product.  The declared waste from each process in the PUREX cycle was analyzed 
for 
240
Pu content.  The 
240
Pu content in the plutonium residue in the waste stream of the 
dissolution of the fuel and cladding was found to be 2.27%.  The waste stream from the 
fission product removal process was found to have a 2.21% 
240
Pu content.  A 2.25% 
240
Pu content was found in the waste from the U/Pu extraction and a 1.31% 
240
Pu content 
was found in the plutonium extraction waste.  The solvent recovery waste had a 1.63% 
240
Pu content.  The disparity between the 
240
Pu content in all of these waste streams and 
the product indicates that the declaration is either incomplete or incorrect or both.  Each 
240
Pu content sampled matches with some part of the declaration.  The product was 
found to be 2.44% 
240
Pu, but if that was the case the true plutonium content in those fuel 
rods should have been around 150g.  To produce 90g of plutonium in the spent fuel, the 
fuel could not be burned as long and it would produce a 
240
Pu content of around 1.4%, 
which is closer to the lower 
240
Pu contents measured.
 (11) 
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 An analysis of the dates of reprocessing was also performed.  This is done by 
measuring the amount of 
241
Am present in the sample, which is only produced by 
241
Pu 
beta decay.  It is a very accurate way of measuring the amount of time that has passed 
since the purification of the plutonium product.  The DPRK only declared one campaign 
that occurred in 1989.  The 
241
Am analysis of the different swipe samples showed other 
campaigns in 1989, 1990, and 1991.
 (11)
  Further analysis of the waste streams also 
showed that spent fuel was sent through the reprocessing facility without fresh fuel with 
it.  This is another contradiction to the declaration. 
 Hans Blix, then director of IAEA, ordered special inspections in 1993 to clear up 
some of these inconsistencies.  As a result, the DPRK announced it was withdrawing 
from the NPT under Article X, which allows member nations to do so in the name of 
„supreme national interests‟ 90 days after they declare withdrawal.  In April of 1994, the 
5 MWe was shut down for a refueling operation.  Former President Jimmy Carter went 
to the DPRK to seek some sort of agreement to halt the program during this time.  A 
freeze was put in place in response to this, but Kim Il Sung, the leader of the DPRK 
since the country‟s foundation, died in July of 1994.  Power was transferred to one of his 
sons, Kim Jong-Il, and the negotiations continued for an enduring agreement.  In August 
of 1994, the Agreed Framework was agreed to by all parties.
 (11) 
 
A.2  Agreed Framework 
 
 The Agreed Framework allowed for an incentive based roll-back of the program.  
Different benchmarks would be met with continued aid and rewards.  In essence, the 
DPRK would dismantle the 5 MWe reactor and the Radiochemical Laboratory, halt 
construction of the 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors, store all spent nuclear fuel, continue 
to be a signatory of the NPT in full compliance, and implement the denuclearization 
agreement it had signed with the Republic of Korea.  In return, the United States would 
provide, through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the 
monetary assistance to provide 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually and two light 
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water reactors.  The conditions for certain deliveries were based on compliance with the 
IAEA and the DPRK‟s NPT obligations. (16)  Fuel oil shipments began almost 
immediately.   
 The fuel discharged from the 5 MWe Reactor would normally corrode under 
water, and observers noted that the spent fuel pond on site was cloudy and had 
inadequate filtering equipment.
 (17)
  Steps were taken to seal and store the spent fuel 
through a canning system which would store the normally very easily corrodible 
magnesium cladding inside a can with an inert atmosphere.  These cans could then be 
stored underwater without fear of radioactive release.  Construction was also begun on 
the two LWR‟s.  However, the agreement started to deteriorate.  KEDO was the lead 
actor in implementing the Agreed Framework.  It was in charge of the fuel oil deliveries 
and the construction of the two LWR‟s.  Due to the political nature of the region and its 
underlying tension, there were several factors that hindered its administration.  These 
factors ranged from requiring a consensus from each of the Executive Board members to 
do anything to being bound to the prevailing political climate of the Korean Peninsula 
and Northeast Asia as a whole.  Therefore, other factors besides those directly involved 
with the mission of KEDO affected its performance.
 (11)
   
 The DPRK also slowed down implementation of the Agreed Framework.  The 
continued design and testing work on ballistic missiles worried some in the United States 
and the other KEDO partners; South Korea, Japan, and the European Union (joined in 
1997).  The slow movement to dismantle the 5 MWe reactor and the Radiochemical 
Laboratory also delayed deliveries of both heavy fuel oil and critical parts for the two 
LWR‟s.  Combined with the difficulties facing KEDO, the untrusting atmosphere around 
the entire situation led to the end of the Agreed Framework.
 (11) 
 
A.3.  Restart and Test 
 
 In 2002, the Agreed Framework was abandoned and North Korea began 
reprocessing the 8000 fuel rods removed from the 5 MWe reactor in 1994.  In early 
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2003, the 5 MWe reactor was refueled and restarted, though there was no evidence of 
restarting construction at the 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactor sites.  The 5 MWe reactor 
was run continuously until 2005, where it was shut down for 45 days for refueling, and 
another 8000 fuel rods were sent to be reprocessed.  The reactor was refueled with fresh 
fuel to continue production of plutonium.   
 On October 9, 2006, the DPRK tested a nuclear device.  Initial reports suggested 
a yield between 5 and 15 kt.  Later calculations from test data showed that the test was 
less than 1 kt in yield.  Fission product gasses were found in the atmosphere in the days 
after the test, confirming that a nuclear detonation had occurred.  There are varying 
opinions regarding the reason for such a small test, the most prominent being that this 
was a failed test.  In the days after that first test, there were reports of preparations for 
subsequent tests; however, no other tests have been confirmed. 
 The test was internationally condemned and prompted a new interest in the Six-
Party Talks. The Six-Party Talks resumed on October 31, 2006.  On February 13, 2007, 
the Six-Party Talks finally came to an agreement to begin the process to permanently 
end and irrevocably disable the Yongbyon complex.  The plan called for 12 disablement 
steps, which could be completed in any order, and ranged from defueling the 5 MWe 
Reactor to removing key pipelines in the Radiochemical Laboratory. The 5 MWe 
Reactor was shut down again in July of 2007 as part of the agreement achieved by the 
Six-Party Talks.
 (18)
   
 
 
A.4.  Decontamination and Dismantlement 
 
 It is the current policy of the United States that the entirety of the DPRK nuclear 
program be dismantled.  This policy could require disposal of completed nuclear 
devices.  In the past, 2 different methods have been used in this situation.  The first 
method would be a simultaneous disposal and verification similar to the methods used to 
verify arms reduction treaties between the US and the USSR/Russia.  The second 
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method would be to verify the disposal of the weapons after their dismantlement similar 
to the situation of South Africa, where the weapons were destroyed before they were 
acknowledged.  Either option requires access to sensitive information by the IAEA and 
meticulous record-keeping.
 (19)
   
 The 5 MWe Reactor was shut down in July of 2007 as part of the agreement 
reached in the Six-Party Talks in February of 2007.  The dismantlement of the 
Radiochemical Laboratory has progressed and would take some time to reverse.  As of 
February 2008, 10 of the 12 disablement steps had been completed.
 (18)
  The 5 MWe is in 
the process of being defueled currently, at the rate of about 20 rods per day.  The cooling 
tower was destroyed by demolition under the watch of international media personnel on 
June 27, 2008.  In the newest declaration of facilities, inventory, and activities, the 
DPRK admitted to having roughly 30 kg of separated plutonium.
 (20)
  This is on the 
lower end of the scale of estimates, and could be representative of just the separated 
plutonium at that time not including the amount used in the 2006 test and plutonium still 
inside the last load of fuel in the 5 MWe Reactor.  It is feasible that the amount 
represents the two cores unloaded in 1994 and 2005 minus whatever was used in the 
2006 test.
 (20)
   
 
B. Facilities 
 
B.1. The Fuel Fabrication Facility 
 
 The Fuel Fabrication Facility was built to provide fuel for the planned 200 MWe 
reactor, but its nominal throughput for most of the 1990‟s and 2000‟s has been about 100 
metric tons of uranium metal fuel per year.  The rate of production was set at this rate to 
provide enough fuel for the 5 MWe Reactor and for the initial loading of the 50 MWe 
that was planned.  The input of the facility is natural uranium, in the form of yellow cake 
U3O8.  This material comes from the mining and conversion facilities located within 
North Korea.  To produce 100 metric tons of fuel, it must process roughly 120 metric 
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tons of U3O8.
 (11)
  The processes that occur in the Fuel Fabrication Facility are shown in 
Fig. 6. 
 The process begins with the dissolving of U3O8 in hot nitric acid.  A 30% TBP 
mixture with kerosene is used in a solvent-extraction phase which is evaporated to 
produce uranyl nitrate.  That uranyl nitrate solution is then heated to produce pure UO3.  
Pure hydrogen is added to produce UO2 in a fluidized bed at around 600 C.  The UO2 is 
then moved to another fluidized bed where it is contacted by gaseous hydrofluoric acid 
at around 500 C to create UF4.  The UF4 is finely ground and reduced with magnesium 
chips and heated to 600-700 C from which a pure uranium metal ingot is produced.  The 
uranium metal is alloyed with aluminum to create a 0.5% uranium-aluminum alloy.  The 
alloy is extruded, heat treated, and machined into the final fuel rod dimensions and 
placed inside of a finned tube made of a magnesium-0.5% zirconium alloy.  The fuel rod 
is finished by welding on an end cap before being placed in storage.
 (11)
 
 
 
Fig. 6: Fuel Fabrication Facility Process Flowsheet 
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 The 5 MWe Reactor requires 50 MT of fuel every two years.  Assuming that the 
Fuel Fabrication Facility only runs at the capacity needed to re-fuel that reactor every 
two years, 25 MT of fuel rods needs to be produced every year which requires 
approximately 28 MT of U3O8.  If the proposed 200 MWe Reactor was finished, and 
assuming it was also refueled every two years, the Fuel Fabrication Facility would be 
required to make 1400 MT of fuel rods every two years.  Therefore the capacity would 
be set at 700 MTU of fuel rods produced per year which would require 785 MT of U3O8.   
 
B.2. The 5 MWe Reactor 
 
 The 5 MWe reactor is a 20 MWth graphite moderated reactor cooled with CO2.  
Natural uranium metal is the fuel for this reactor, and the design is based off the first 
commercial electricity producing reactors at Calder Hall, built in the United Kingdom in 
1956.
 (11)
  The final design is indigenous to North Korea, as are the materials used in 
construction. 
 The operating history of the reactor is unclear, but for the most part it is known 
that it operated with a high capacity factor from the second half of 1991 to April 1994 
and again from February 2003 to July 2007.  From January 1986, when the reactor first 
went critical, through the first half of 1991, the DPRK had some trouble operating the 
reactor and it did not have a high capacity factor.
 (11)
  The DPRK has admitted to burning 
3 core loads of fuel, plus some replacement fuel for broken rods.  However, there are 
sources that will dispute that claim, and assert that during the first run of the reactor, the 
core was at least partially refueled.
 (11)
  This would explain some of the discrepancies 
with the declaration that North Korea made in 1993.  There also was an outage shown in 
satellite photographs of the cooling tower that was long enough to refuel the entire 
reactor in 1990.  The DPRK has never admitted to shutting down and refueling the 
reactor during this time.
 (11)
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 The design of the reactor has been published in journals, which allows for 
modeling in a transport-based fuel depletion code.  For this research, the reactor will be 
modeled in TransLAT as a 2-d lattice.
 (21)
  This code was chosen for the ease in which 
the geometry of the reactor can be input as well as the ability to simulate full core 
burnups with limited computing power.  The TransLAT simulated model used is a 4x4 
array of fuel rods surrounded by graphite with a control rod hole present in the middle of 
the array shown in Fig. 7.  The array was used to generate average plutonium production 
values across the fuel pins which can be translated into total plutonium production for 
the core.  The model was also used to generate average cross sections for use in a two 
group, two region diffusion problem to solve for the power profile. 
 
 
Fig. 7: TransLAT Model of the 5 MWe Reactor 
 
The model used is a 4x4 array of fuel rods surrounded by graphite with a control 
rod hole present in the middle of the array.  The array was used to generate average 
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plutonium buildup values across the fuel pins which can be translated into total 
plutonium buildup for the core.  The model was also used to generate average cross 
sections for use in a two group, two region diffusion problem to solve for the power 
profile.  TransLAT is a 3-d deterministic lattice physics burnup software that is used to 
evaluate the performance and characteristics of different reactors.
 (21)
  
 
 The 5 MWe reactor has an abnormal axial power profile due to the way in which 
it is run.  When it is initially started, it is run with control rods inserted about one third 
the way into the core.  This causes a non-uniform axial power profile which affects the 
burnup of the fuel in the core.  Power peaks much more severely than the normally 
assumed cosine shape of a standard power profile.  As a result, some fuel rods received 
an abnormally high burnup close to 1,370 MWth-day/metric ton of uranium while others 
received only 64 MWth-day/metric ton of uranium during the initial core loading.
 (11)
  
Because of this abnormal axial power profile, the total 
240
Pucontent from the reactor will 
be slightly higher than it would have been at the same average burnup with a cosine 
shaped power profile.  To calculate this new profile, a simple two region one group 
diffusion calculation is made using averaged cross sections of all the materials in each 
region.
 (22) 
 Averaged cross sections were generated in TransLAT for the 4x4 assembly with 
control rod material in the center hole and with CO2 as well.  These cross sections were 
used in the two region, two group diffusion system of equations and solved numerically 
using a software package named Maple.
 (23)
  The Maple worksheet can be found in 
Appendix B.  The calculated power profile of the reactor can be found in Fig. 8. 
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Fig. 8: Power Profile 
 
The power profile is significantly depressed in the region with the control rod.  
This forces a higher power in the lower part of the core, which is where the materials of 
the reactor will be most stressed.  The power profile can be used to determine the 
centerline temperature of the fuel, as well as the temperature distribution from fuel 
centerline through the bulk temperature of the coolant.
 (22)
  To obtain those temperatures, 
the temperature of the coolant is first calculated using: 
 
TBulk z = Tin+ 
q
Max
''' ∙2.32∙Achannel∙H
m ∙cp, CO2
∙ P z dz
z
0
 (1)  
where Tin is the inlet temperature of the coolant, q
‟‟‟
Max is the maximum volumetric heat 
generation rate, AChannel is the area of the coolant flow channel, H is the active height of 
the core, ṁ is the mass flow rate of the coolant, cp, CO2 is the specific heat capacity of the 
CO2 coolant, and P(z) is the power profile.  The 2.32 constant reflects the radial power 
profile, it is the peak to average ratio of the zero order Bessel function that governs the 
radial power profile.  Eq. 1 is then used to determine the temperature of the inner 
cladding surface: 
 
TCI z = TBulk z + 
2π∙q
Max
''' ∙rCI
2
2∙kclad
P(z)∙ ln
rCO
rCI
+ 
2π∙q
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where rCI is the inside cladding radius, kClad is the conductivity of the cladding, P(z) is 
the power profile at that location, rCO is the outer radius of the cladding, and h is the 
enthalpy of the coolant.  This point is the highest temperature in the clad.  Due to the 
cladding being a magnesium alloy, the working temperature is around 650 C; above that 
temperature, the magnesium will lose structural strength and be unable to support the 
mass of the fuel.  In order to guarantee the integrity of the reactor and the structural 
stability of the fuel, the cladding temperature will be limited to 600 C.  Finally, the 
maximum temperature of the fuel is calculated by: 
 
TCL z = TCI z + 
q
Max
''' ∙rCI
2
kFuel
 (3)  
where kFuel is the conductivity of the fuel and TCL(z) is the temperature of the centerline 
of the fuel.  The melting temperature of uranium metal is 1132.2 C, and the limit will be 
set at 1000 C. 
 Using the previous equations with the already established power profile, we can 
generate the temperature profile in the hottest channel in the reactor.  As can be seen in 
Fig. 9, the limiting factor is the temperature of the cladding.  At the rated power of 20 
MWth, the cladding reaches a maximum temperature of around 590 °C, which is close 
the 600 °C limit.  Therefore, it can be safely assumed that the power of the reactor is 
limited to the stated maximum power. 
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Fig. 9: Temperature Profile of the 5 MWe 
 
 The TransLAT model will be used to estimate the plutonium production of the 
reactor.  TransLAT will give concentrations of isotopes in the spent fuel, which can be 
converted into an amount of plutonium per core load.  For this test case, several different 
burnup steps will be simulated.  For the last two completed core loads, the fuel has been 
burned around 2 years before being replaced.  Using that time step, it is possible to 
calculate an average burnup of the core for that amount of time.  It will be assumed that 
the reactor is run for approximately 300 days per year or 600 days per core.  The amount 
of fuel initially loaded into the core is estimated to be about 50 MT of uranium metal.  
The full thermal power of the reactor will be assumed to be a constant 20 MWth.  
Burnup is calculated by: 
 
Burnup= 
Power  MWth ∙# of Days at Power
Mass of Fuel in MT
 (4)  
reactor power is set at 20 MW(th) and the mass of uranium in the fuel is 50 MT. 
From that equation, the average burnup of the fuel  from the February 2003 through 
April 2005 burn can be estimated to be about 240 MW days per metric ton by assuming 
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
T
em
p
er
a
tu
re
, 
C
Position from the bottom of the core (m)
40% rod inserted, 20 MWth
Tcl
Tci
Tbulk
 30 
300 days of operation per year over a two year time span.  TransLAT will be used to 
simulate several potential burnup steps, from fresh fuel to 300 MW days per metric ton.  
Fig. 10 shows those estimated values. 
 
 
Fig. 10: Plutonium Production in the 5 MWe Reactor 
 
The values that TransLAT has estimated are on the upper end of the ISIS 
estimates of 6-7 kg per year of plutonium.  The estimates may be a little high compared 
the actual production, but for the purposes of this test case it is acceptably conservative.  
The 
239
Pu content of the spent fuel from this reactor is also seen to be very high at 
different burnups in Fig. 11. 
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Fig. 11: 
239
Pu Content of the 5 MWe Spent Fuel 
 
B.3. The Radiochemical Laboratory 
 
 The Radiochemical Laboratory is the key facility to safeguard in this fuel cycle.  
If the material passing through this facility can be adequately safeguarded, the pathway 
for the state to generate separated plutonium is severely hampered.  This facility is an 
industrial scale reprocessing facility capable of reprocessing 220-250 tons of spent 
nuclear fuel per year, which is enough for both the 5 MWe and the proposed 50 MWe 
reactors.  There are two lines that are completely independent.  The facility uses the 
„chop-leach‟ PUREX process with chemical decladding. (11)  A general flow sheet for the 
processes of the Radiochemical Laboratory is shown in Fig. 12. 
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Fig. 12: Process Flowsheet for Radiochemical Laboratory
 
 
 The PUREX process used at the Radiochemical Laboratory is very similar to that 
of commercial facilities with very few changes.
 (24)
  The fuel is processed in batches of 
20 rods, and each rod has structural pieces, like end-sections and grappling tabs 
removed.  From there, a hot, dilute nitric acid mixture is added to dissolve away the 
magnesium-zirconium cladding.  Each batch is transferred to another dissolver and 
broken up into smaller, 5 rod batches.  Hot, concentrated nitric acid is added to each of 
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the smaller batches to dissolve the fuel rods.  All of the volatile and some of the semi-
volatile fission products are removed from the fuel and released as off gas at this time.  
There is an accountability tank that is used to sample and analyze the spent fuel solution 
that now contains nitrates of uranium, plutonium, and nonvolatile fission products.
 (25)
   
From the accountability tank, the solution is pumped into several mixer-settlers 
and mixed with a 30% TBP-kerosene in the first decontamination cycle.  There are about 
30 mixer-settlers per line in this decontamination cycle, each with an 80 liter capacity.  
Three aqueous streams are pumped into the bank: one of the fuel dissolver solution, a 
uranium stripping solution, and a plutonium stripping solution.  Three aqueous streams 
are also removed: one of fission products, one of uranium, and one of plutonium.  The 
organic stream strips all but about 2% of the uranium and plutonium together and leaves 
the fission products in the aqueous stream.  The uranium and plutonium rich organic 
stream is then stripped of uranium using dilute nitric acid.  The plutonium is then 
stripped using an aqueous nitrate solution of hydroxylamine and hydrazine.  The organic 
stream is available for re-use after this stripping step.
 (25) 
The plutonium stream is then purified through another round of solvent 
extraction.  In a commercial plant, this would also be done on the uranium stream, 
however the DPRK has never implemented a uranium purification stream.  They classify 
the aqueous uranium stream as waste.
 (11)
 
To estimate the material flows through this facility, there are a few small 
calculations that need to be made.  First, it is known that a full core load of 8000 rods 
were reprocessed in the first six months of 2003.  Knowing that the facility is run in 
batch mode with two lines present using 20 rods per batch, it is fairly easy to see that 
roughly 2.5 batches are completed every day on average.  Using the TransLAT 
simulation to determine a nominal plutonium output for a core, the average amount of 
plutonium per fuel rod and subsequently per batch can be calculated.  About 100g of 
plutonium enters the facility on average per day.   
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CHAPTER III 
PROPOSED SAFEGUARDS 
 
 In the previous chapter, the Yongbyon fuel cycle was fully mapped out and the 
material throughput of the facilities was stated.  That information will be used to design 
a material accountancy program around the fuel cycle to safeguard the material from 
being used in a weapons program.  However, there is one facility that is already under a 
safeguards agreement and will not be included in this project.  The IRT reactor is still 
under an INFCIRC-66 type agreement, and there is no need to change that.  In its current 
configuration, the IRT is capable of producing about 0.4 kg of plutonium per year by 
irradiating natural uranium targets.
 (26)
  As will be seen later, this amount is much lower 
than the anticipated uncertainty associated with the plutonium measurements inside the 
Radiochemical Laboratory.  Therefore the plutonium production of the IRT can be 
ignored in this safeguards arrangement.  The fuel cycle will also be modeled with some 
slight modifications to the way in which material flows through it due to unfinished 
construction and the need to safeguard uranium in the spent fuel.  The modeled fuel 
cycle is shown in Fig. 13.  The 50 MWe and the 200 MWe Reactors were never finished 
and the Radiochemical Laboratory does not currently recover uranium from spent fuel.  
That uranium must also be safeguarded.  The modeled fuel cycle will include a uranium 
recovery stage in the Radiochemical Laboratory. 
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Fig. 13: Modeled Fuel Cycle 
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A. The Fuel Fabrication Facility 
 
 Each process in the fuel fabrication plant changes the chemical form of the 
uranium, not the isotopic ratio of 
235
U to 
238
U, which simplifies the safeguards process.  
The material throughput and processes of this facility have been researched; therefore 
the analysis will begin by establishing the safeguards goals for this facility.   
Because this is a fuel cycle based off of natural uranium, the timeliness goal 
mandated by the IAEA for detection of a significant quantity is 75kg of 
235
U within 3 
months.  The facility is theorized to be capable of producing enough fuel to adequately 
fuel the planned but never completed 200 MWe reactor.
 (11)
  The proposed system will be 
tested for two different capacities, one capacity based off of the needs of the 5 MWe 
reactor and another based off of the proposed needs for the 200 MWe reactor.  Only one 
MBA will be used in the proposed safeguards system for the fuel fabrication plant, and it 
will cover the entire process from when the U3O8 enters the facility to the finished fuel 
rods of the alloyed uranium metal exit the facility for fresh fuel storage.  The same MBA 
will be used for both capacities, and the same type of detectors will be used to measure 
input and output.  Also, there will be no simulated losses of material inside the facility. 
 In order to adequately safeguard this facility, an analysis of the potential 
pathways that an inside entity would use to divert material must occur.  This facility has 
only indirect-use material, so its contents have less stringent requirements than a facility 
that actually enriched uranium or handles plutonium.  Natural uranium in any of the 
chemical forms found inside the facility is not a direct use material.  Taking material 
from any point in the process from U3O8 to U metal will never give the proliferator a 
suitable bomb making material.  Furthermore, the most common material used in 
enrichment facilities, UF6, is not produced or stored at this facility.  The most likely 
material diverted from this facility would be either the U3O8 as it is brought into the 
facility, or the uranium metal fuel rods as they leave the facility.  The nuclear material 
accountancy program at the fuel fabrication facility must accomplish three goals: it must 
verify that it receives all of the U3O8 from the mining and milling operation, it must 
 37 
guarantee that no material is lost during the process from U3O8 to uranium metal, and it 
must account for each fuel rod that is shipped off to the reactor. 
 To accomplish those goals, an MBA will be placed around the facility covering 
from when the U3O8 enters the facility through the finished fuel rod complete with 
cladding exiting the facility and placed in fresh fuel storage.  The amount of 
235
U needs 
to be measured on the way in and on the way out.  To find the amount of 
235
U in the 
U3O8, we need to know the enrichment of the material and the mass of the U3O8 coming 
into the MBA.  To calculate the amount of 
235
U in the U3O8 the following equation is 
used: 
 
Mass of U
235
= Mass of U3O8 ∙ 
Mass of uranium
Mass of U3O8
 ∙ U235  Enrichment (5)  
where the mass of U3O8 and the 
235
U enrichment is measured and the amount of uranium 
in U3O8 is a constant based off the molar weights of uranium and oxygen. This equation 
is made up of constants and measured values.  For the incoming U3O8, the mass fraction 
of uranium in the U3O8 will always be the same for a given enrichment.  In this case, 
with natural uranium and oxygen, the atomic masses from any periodic table can be used 
to calculate this quantity.  It is assumed to have a negligible uncertainty with regards to 
the other two measurements, so it will be ignored in the uncertainty analysis.  The other 
two parts of the equation will be measured.  Normally, U3O8 is shipped using 30 or 55 
gallon drums.  These drums are heavy enough that to measure their mass, it would be 
beneficial to use a Load Cell Based Weighing system (LCBS).  For the enrichment 
measurement, there are a few options, and the choice is dependent upon the capacity of 
the facility.  There are many different systems that can measure enrichment, both by 
destructive analysis (DA) and non-destructive analysis (NDA).  NDA is easier to 
perform, cheaper, and faster than DA, however the results have higher uncertainties.  For 
the DPRK program, the throughput of this facility allows the higher uncertainty of NDA 
to be acceptable.  A Portable Multi-Channel Analyzer coupled with a NaI detector will 
have adequate uncertainties for this facility when it is producing fuel for the 5 or 50 
MWe reactors, but the uncertainties begin to be unacceptable for the needs of the 
proposed 200 MWe reactor.   
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 While the NaI detector is certainly capable of determining the enrichment of the 
uranium, its higher uncertainty forces the Material Balance Period to 14 days.  If the fuel 
fabrication facility ever begins processing 700 MT/yr of material, a better measurement 
with lower uncertainties will most likely be needed at both the input and output of the 
facility.  One way to do that would be to use a High Purity Germanium (HPGe) detector 
in place of the NaI detector.  NaI detectors have a random and systematic uncertainty of 
5%, while HPGe detectors have a random uncertainty of 3% and systematic uncertainty 
of 2%.
 (27)
   
As can be seen in Fig. 14, the fuel fabrication MBA is fairly easy to set up.  The 
overall throughput is relatively small compared to other facilities worldwide when it is 
just producing fuel for the 5 MWe Reactor.  There is no enrichment of 
235
U, and there is 
no presence of plutonium in this facility.  This is easily accomplished by the following. 
 As the uranium enters the facility, it will be weighed and have its enrichment 
measured.  Both of these measurements will have uncertainties with them.  Those 
uncertainties will be taken from the ITV-2000 which is a document produced by the 
IAEA that defines the expected random and systematic uncertainties for many detectors 
commonly used in nuclear safeguard systems.  For the LCBS and the EBAL weighing 
devices, the random and systematic uncertainty is the same at 0.5%.   
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Fig. 14: Proposed Fuel Fabrication MBA Set Up 
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 This facility will be analyzed for 2 different scenarios, the first at its 
hypothesized full capacity which is enough to fuel the planned 200 MWe reactor and the 
second with the capacity set for only the needs of the 5 MWe Reactor.  It will be 
assumed that both reactors run on a similar cycle as the 5 MWe Reactor did for the 4 
years it was restarted, 2003-2007.  With that assumption, the two capacities that will be 
simulated are 700 MT and 25 MT of fuel rods that will need to be made per year.  Table 
2 shows the 700 MT/yr analysis. 
 
Table 2: Fuel Fabrication Uncertainty Analysis at 700 MT/yr 
Input 
 
Output 
U3O8 Input 2740 kg/day   U metal 2320 kg/day 
235
U Input 16.7 kg/day   
235
U Output 16.7 kg/day 
       MUF input 16.5 kg 
 
MUF output 16.5 kg 
       Sigma MUF 23.4 kg 
 
Capacity 700 MT/yr 
       IAEA Target 25 kg 
 
MBP 14 days 
 
As can be seen in the table, a very short MBP is required for this capacity.  There 
is a great quantity of material being processed in the facility per day which drives up the 
uncertainty of any measurement.  To increase the MBP at this capacity, a better 
measurement is needed.  If the NaI detectors are replaced with HPGe detectors, the MBP 
can be increased to over 140 days, which is a much better figure. Longer MBP‟s allows 
for less shutdown time to flush out the processes in a facility which saves the operator 
money. 
 Table 3 shows the uncertainty analysis of the Fuel Fabrication Facility at the 
capacity of 25 MT/yr.  For this capacity, the MBP can be much longer with the NaI 
detectors.  No MBP can exceed the timeliness goal for detection of diversion, therefore 
the limit on the MBP for this case is the timeliness goal.   
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Table 3: Uncertainty Analysis of the Fuel Fabrication Facility at 25 MT/yr 
Input 
 
Output 
U3O8 Input 97.8 kg/day   U metal 82.9 kg/day 
235
U Input 0.597 kg/day   
235
UOutput  0.597 kg/day 
       
MUF input 15.4 kg 
 
MUF output 15.4 kg 
       
Sigma MUF 21.8 kg 
 
Capacity 25 MT/yr 
       
IAEA Target 25 kg 
 
MBP 365 days 
 
 The MBA that has been set up in both cases will accomplish the two goals of 
safeguards.  The material is measured as it enters the facility, this value can be checked 
against the information sent from the mill and should match.  If there is any material 
diverted from one of the chemical processes inside the facility, less material would be 
measured in the finished fuel rods.  The addition of a substitute material to make up the 
weight of any diverted uranium would also be detected by the gamma spectroscopy 
equipment.  The finished fuel rods can be item accounted as they leave the facility, and 
this number should match the number of rods created.   
 
B. The 5 MWe Reactor 
 
 The 5 MWe Reactor is the easiest facility to safeguard in the entire fuel cycle.  
Self contained fuel rods come in, and the amount of uranium and its enrichment can be 
verified easily, and self contained spent fuel rods leave.  Item accounting will work for 
this facility, matching the number of rods in and the number of rods out is simple work.  
Fig. 15 shows the MBA set up for the 5 MWe reactor. 
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Fig. 15: Proposed 5 MWe Reactor MBA Set Up 
 
The most common diversion pathway for a reactor involves removing a single 
fuel rod from an assembly.  This fuel rod can be from either fresh fuel or spent fuel.  For 
this reactor, that pathway will not be available because the fuel is loaded as individual 
rods, not assemblies.  There is still the potential for a single rod to be diverted, but that 
diversion would be accounted for when the number of fuel rods leaving the reactor did 
not match the number of fuel rods entering the reactor.  
 The reactor must be more carefully analyzed to fully guarantee total material 
accountancy.  The reactor could be run at a higher than stated power level, which would 
cause an increase in the amount of plutonium that is created for the same amount of 
irradiation time.  Also, if there is a covert supply of fuel, it is possible to achieve the 
same burnup on the fuel in a shorter amount of time, which would allow the reactor to 
have the fuel replaced sometime during a normal cycle to allow for covert plutonium 
production with undeclared fuel.  In general, the reactor needs to be analyzed for both 
what is stated by the country as normal operation as well as the maximum capacity in 
terms of plutonium production.  In this case, as Chapter II shows, this reactor is 
operating at very close to the thermodynamic limits of the materials in the reactor.  
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Running the reactor at a higher power would have a higher probability of causing some 
of the reactor materials to fail.  Therefore, the operating history of the reactor should be 
verified through measuring the burnup of the spent fuel, but the day to day operation of 
the reactor does not need to be monitored.  The fuel loading machine should also be 
locked down and sealed during reactor operation. 
 For the accountancy system at the 5 MWe reactor, it is all item accounting.  Fuel 
comes in as discrete rods, which will be counted as they enter the fresh fuel storage.  
Each rod will be counted also as it is loaded into the reactor, and as it leaves the reactor.  
To guard against switching fuel rods for rods without fissile material, each rod will be 
passed through an ion chamber as it is pulled from the reactor by the fuel loading 
machine.  Spent fuel rods will have a fairly high activity, while any other material will 
have a different amount of activity. 
 
C. The Radiochemical Laboratory 
 
 The last step in the fuel cycle to be analyzed is the Radiochemical Laboratory.    
This facility is the sole location in the entire fuel cycle that at some point has separated 
fissile material in a form that is readily used for weapons purposes.  The types of 
processes that occur in the facility were explained in Chapter II, and the amount of 
material that this facility can process was also explained.  Unlike the Fuel Fabrication 
Facility, there is a direct use material present in this facility.  Plutonium and plutonium 
bearing materials are a much better target for a proliferator because once the plutonium 
has been chemically separated it is weapons usable.  There are many barriers that 
naturally slow down a proliferator, however.  As spent fuel enters the facility, it is highly 
radioactive and not easy to handle.  That is a barrier that a proliferator would have to 
overcome.  Each step in the process represents a different challenge for a proliferator, 
but the same problem for a safeguards system.  Therefore, one MBA can be used from 
when the spent fuel is first loaded to be dissolved through the storage of the uranium and 
plutonium products. 
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 The diversion pathways of the Radiochemical Laboratory are classic for any 
PUREX process.  For this project four pathways will be analyzed: diverting a spent fuel 
rod from the spent fuel storage, diverting dissolved fuel, diverting the dissolved fuel 
after it has been cleansed of fission products, and diverting PuO2 from storage.  These 
four pathways are the classic diversion scenarios for a PUREX facility, and they test the 
integrity of the proposed accountancy program adequately. 
 Normally, there are no measurements of plutonium content until after the fission 
products are removed from the spent fuel solution.  The reasons behind that decision are 
two-fold, first the plutonium signal is drowned out by other isotopes in the spent fuel, 
like curium, and second the uncertainties associated with such measurements are very 
high, on the order of 25%.  However, because the total amount of plutonium is small in 
this case, and the timeliness goal is relatively large compared to the amount of plutonium 
that is inside the facility at any given time, that amount of uncertainty is actually 
acceptable for a facility of this size.  For this facility, a full accountancy program will 
work and the needs for containment and surveillance are lessened because of it.  The 
bulk of the facility can be placed inside one MBA that encompasses everything from the 
cladding dissolution through the purification of the uranium and plutonium streams.  For 
the purposes of this analysis, it will be assumed that the Radiochemical Laboratory will 
have the uranium purification step added to its process line.  This assumption is made to 
lower the total amount of material that is considered waste that would contain large 
amounts of uranium which must also be safeguarded.  There are two exits from the main 
MBA, one from the purified uranium stream and one from the purified plutonium 
stream.  Fig. 16 shows the MBA set up for the Radiochemical Laboratory. 
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Fig. 16: MBA Set Up for the Radiochemical Laboratory 
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To estimate the material flows through this facility, there are a few small 
calculations that need to be made.  First, it is known that a full core load of 8000 rods 
were reprocessed in the first six months of 2003.  Knowing that the facility is run in 
batch mode with two lines present using 20 rods per batch, it is fairly easy to see that 
roughly 2.5 batches are completed every day on average.  Using the TransLAT 
simulation to determine a nominal plutonium output for a core, the average amount of 
plutonium per fuel rod and subsequently per batch can be calculated.  About 100g of 
plutonium enters the facility on average per day.  The average amount of plutonium 
going through the MBA per MBP is then found by estimating an appropriate MBP and 
multiplying the average amount of plutonium going through per day by the days in the 
MBP.   
At this point, the detection methods need to be decided.  This facility will be 
analyzed in two cycles, a plutonium cycle and a uranium cycle.  The material entering 
the facility will be measured using a combination of a computer code simulation of the 
core combined with a measurement of the activity of the spent fuel to estimate the 
burnup.  As can be seen in Fig. 10 from the previous chapter, plutonium will build up 
almost linearly with burnup, which means an approximation of the plutonium content of 
the fuel can be made.  As previously mentioned, the uncertainty of this measurement is 
very high, but in this case acceptable due to the small amounts of material that are 
passing through the facility per day.  On the other end of the process, there is a refined 
product of pure PuO2 in powder form, which makes this a bulk material.  To quantify the 
amount of plutonium at that end the High Level Neutron Coincidence Counter (HLNC) 
will be used. The HLNC is a device that passively measures the amount of plutonium in 
anything from sub gram to 10 kg size quantities.  It also has a fairly low uncertainty 
associated with its measurement.  Now, with the measurement system determined, the 
actual simulated accountancy can begin.  For this purpose, each chemical process will be 
considered to have some loss of material associated with it.  These losses are meant to 
model a real facility, and are based off of published data on the Hanford plutonium 
extraction efficiency from the 1960‟s. (28)  For this simulation, it is assumed that about 
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0.7% of the plutonium is lost in the chemical processes from beginning to end, which is 
slightly higher than the published results.  The estimated loss is higher than the 
published data for a few reasons.  First, the higher losses will inflate the amount of MUF 
calculated, which will cause a more conservative MBP than assuming no losses have 
occurred.  Second, the amount of loss is probably higher for the DPRK due to a less 
developed chemical industry and expertise.   
The following table shows the breakdown of plutonium over various burnups.   
 
Table 4: Plutonium Amount used in Simulation 
Burnup of 240 MWd/MT 
Simulated Total Pu Per Core (g) 13100 
Average Pu per rod (g) 1.64 
Average Pu per batch (g) 32.8 
Average Pu per day (g) 82.1 
Average Pu per MBP (g) 2460 
 
In Table 4, an MBP of 30 days was used to calculate the plutonium entering the facility 
per MBP.  As in the Fuel Fabrication Facility, there can only be one MBP per facility 
and it is limited by the length of the shortest timeliness goal applicable to the facility 
based on the types of material inside the facility.  Therefore, the maximum MBP for the 
Radiochemical Laboratory was set at 30 days.  The TransLAT results give a reasonable 
amount of plutonium produced per core load every two years, on the high side of the 
estimates released from ISIS.  Simple arithmetic was used to calculate the other values in 
the table knowing that each core is composed of 8000 rods, each batch is made up of 20 
rods, and about 2.5 batches are completed each day.  Table 5 shows the simulated losses 
in the chemical process. 
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Table 5: Waste Plutonium Estimation 
MBA #2 Pu Pu (g) Waste Pu (g) 
Pu after Decladding (g) 2440 19.7 
Pu after Dissolving (g) 2440 3.66 
Pu after FP Removal (g) 2430 3.66 
Pu after Purification (g) 2430 2.43 
 
These values were estimated by assuming a flat 0.8% loss of material in the chemical 
decladding phase, 0.15% loss of material in both the fuel dissolving and fission product 
removal stages, and a 0.1% loss in the purification step.  A total loss of around 0.7% of 
the material is achieved this way, which is in line with other PUREX facilities around 
the world.   
 Now that the amount of simulated material is known at each step, it is possible to 
evaluate the proposed system of detectors to calculate the MBP that will be required to 
achieve the timeliness goal.  The mass entering the second MBA, the mass that will be 
measured using the burnup correlation model, will be called M1 for this simulation.  The 
mass leaving the second MBA after the purification step, the mass being measured by 
the HLNC will be called M2.  From the Passive Nondestructive Assay of Nuclear 
Materials, the uncertainty of a burnup correlation to plutonium production has a 
systematic uncertainty of 25% and a random uncertainty of 3.9%.
 (14)
  Combining the 
two figures the uncertainty the M1 measurement is calculated to be 25.3%.  From the 
ITV-2000 publication, the HLNC has a random uncertainty of 1% and a systematic 
uncertainty of 0.5% for a combined uncertainty of the M2 measurement of 1.12%.
 (27)
  
Using the 30 day MBP of Tables 4 and 5, the following results in Table 6 can be found. 
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Table 6: Uncertainty Analysis on Pu Measurements 
M1 Uncertainty (g) 623 
M2 Uncertainty (g) 27.2 
MUF Uncertainty (g) 623 
IAEA Target (g) 2670 
MBP = 30 days  
 
The 30 day MBP works and the 3 sigma value is below the 8 kg significant quantity in 
the timeliness goal.  Having an MBP this long is very desirable for many reasons.  
Knowing that with these relatively inexpensive detector systems a material accountancy 
program can be sustained means that there is some leeway in the decision on which 
detector to use.  Also, this MBP allows the IAEA to have fewer inspections which can 
be costly.  Once the plutonium cycle has been effectively safeguarded, there is one other 
aspect to consider, the uranium cycle. 
 The current layout of the Radiochemical Laboratory does not have any steps 
designed to extract uranium from the spent fuel solution.  In its present operation, that 
uranium is considered waste.  However, it does not have to be wasted, and it could be 
sold to be re-enriched or for some other use.  It is slightly depleted uranium, and should 
also be placed under safeguards.  For the purposes of this simulation, it will be assumed 
that the last part of the cycle has been completed and that uranium will be separated and 
purified for either long term storage or for use later.  The same MBA‟s will be used and 
some of the same equipment will be used to measure the 
235
U inside the uranium.  
Again, a burnup simulation will be done to estimate the amount of uranium and what its 
enrichment is for a given burnup.  The same uncertainties still apply.   
For this part of the cycle, only the amount of 
235
U is safeguarded, and the IAEA‟s 
timeliness goals are 75kg of 
235
U within 3 months.  Therefore, only 
235
U will be tracked 
in this simulation.  Table 7 shows the amount of uranium and its enrichment per MBP at 
varying burnups. 
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Table 7: U per MBP 
Burnup of 240 MWd/MT 
U per core (g) 50400000 
Average 
235
U Enrichment 0.00703 
Average 
235
U(g) per core 354000 
Average 
235
U per rod (g) 44.3 
Average 
235
U per batch (g) 886 
Average 
235
U per day (g) 1770 
Average 
235
U per MBP (g) 53100 
 
 
The TransLAT output gives the amount of uranium in the 4x4 array, so those values 
have been extrapolated over the entire core.  The MBP remains 30 days to achieve those 
values.  At beginning of life in the core the right amount of uranium is present, so the 
values look appropriate.  Also, the amount of uranium processed per day is around 250 
kg, which is in the ballpark of the 375 kg that was stated in 1994 as their peak daily 
capacity.
 (29)
  The enrichment is slightly higher than the input file shows, but is 
nonetheless close to the true value at beginning of life.  The rest of the values, including 
the later enrichment values, are average values derived in the same way that the average 
plutonium values were.  The chemical processes will also cause uranium losses, and the 
same percentages will be used to estimate those losses. 
 
Table 8: U losses 
MBA #2 U 
235
U (g) Waste 
235
U (g) 
235
U after Decladding 52700 425 
235
U after Dissolving 52600 79.1 
235
U after FP Removal 52600 79 
235
U after Purification 52500 52.6 
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Table 8 is calculated exactly the same way as Table 5, and gives the second mass to use 
for the uncertainty analysis.  Using the same burnup correlation model from the 
plutonium cycle with the same uncertainties, the incoming σMUF can be calculated.  For 
the outgoing uranium, a different system is needed.  This will require a combination of 
systems, first the material will be weighed using an electronic balance (EBAL in the 
ITV-2000).  This measurement should have a systematic and random uncertainty of 
0.5%.
 (27)
  The material will also be measured using a portable NaI detector to get the 
enrichment, with a systematic and random uncertainty of 5%.
 (27)
  Table 9 has the 
anticipated results from the uranium uncertainty analysis. 
 
Table 9: Uranium Measurement Uncertainty Analysis 
M1 Sigma MUF 
235
U (g) 13400 
M2 Sigma MUF 
235
U (g) 3710 
Sigma MUF 
235
U (g) 14000 
IAEA target 
235
U (g) 25000 
MBP = 30 days  
 
 
As can be seen in Table 9, the M1 measurement has a high uncertainty associated with 
it.  This drives the achievable MBP much lower, and so limits the allowable MBP for the 
whole facility.  That result is surprising, because normally plutonium would be the 
overriding concern of any safeguards regime, however in this facility the uranium poses 
a more important factor when the timeliness goals are considered.  Therefore, the MBP 
for the Radiochemical Laboratory must be set at 40 days to achieve all of the 
requirements of the timeliness goals. 
 The final check on the goals of the accountancy program shows that all four 
diversion pathways mentioned previously are detected.  A missing spent fuel rod would 
be detected when the number leaving storage did not match the number entering storage.  
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The amount of plutonium is estimated before any fuel is dissolved, and the estimation is 
sufficient to detect a diversion of any of the dissolved fuel with or without fission 
products.  The amount of plutonium available in the fuel also works in the favor of the 
accountancy program, because the plutonium is very dilute.  Dilute plutonium would 
require a massive diversion to build up any amount of plutonium larger than gram size 
quantities.  Diverting stored PuO2 would also be detected because there is a very good 
measurement of the amount of plutonium entering storage.  That plutonium is to be 
stored in cans and sealed.  As long as the seal is not broken, the amount of plutonium in 
each can will remain the same and can be re-verified at any time. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 The first step in implementing safeguards on any fuel cycle is to understand what 
facilities are present in the fuel cycle and what their responsibilities to each other are.  In 
the case of the DPRK, there are 3 major facilities: the Fuel Fabrication Facility, the 5 
MWe Reactor, and the Radiochemical Laboratory.  The Fuel Fabrication Facility was 
originally designed to fuel the 3 planned reactors, with a top capacity of 700 MT/yr of 
uranium metal fuel rods, however its current capacity is a smaller 25 MT/yr.  The 5 
MWe Reactor is the only completed production reactor and completes burning one core 
load of fuel every 2 years.  The Radiochemical Laboratory was also designed to 
accommodate a larger capacity and reprocess the fuel of at least 2 of the planned reactors 
and has reprocessed 50 MT of spent fuel within 6 months in the past.     
 The goals of the safeguards system were set based off the significant quantity and 
timeliness goals that the IAEA uses.  In order to achieve those goals, the 5 MWe Reactor 
had to be modeled to simulate its capabilities.    This modeling must be complete, from 
estimating plutonium production to estimating the full thermal limits of the reactors. 
From open source references, the dimensions and characteristics of the reactor can be 
modeled in a computer code.  There are several to choose from, for this case TransLAT 
was used.  The TransLAT simulation estimated that roughly 6.7 kg of plutonium could 
be produced per year in the 5 MWe Reactor, which is in the upper range of the 6-7kg 
estimates from ISIS.
 (11)
  TransLAT also calculated averaged cross sections used to 
calculate the axial power profile in the reactor.  The profile was solved using a two-
group, two-region diffusion system of equations that verified the 20 MWth output of the 
core. 
 The throughput of material for each facility was researched.  Each facility 
consists of processes that transform or form the special nuclear material.  Open source 
material was used to generate the needed data.  The process that occurs in the Fuel 
Fabrication Facility is fairly straightforward, and due to the constraints of monitoring 
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natural uranium, the key measurement points are easily identified as the input from the 
mine and the output of finished fuel rods.  The Radiochemical Laboratory uses the 
PUREX process, which has been well understood for decades.  Due to the presence of 
both uranium and plutonium, both materials need to be accounted for.  For this approach, 
the spent fuel is analyzed and the plutonium content is actually estimated for use in the 
material accountancy.  This is abnormal for a reprocessing facility, however the amount 
of material that is processed in this facility allows for the higher uncertainties associated 
with this measurement.    
 Proliferation pathways are present in every facility, and in order to maintain 
confidence in the safeguards regime they must be addressed.  At the Fuel Fabrication 
Facility, the natural uranium used causes the potential proliferator to divert large 
amounts of the material to be effective.  The 5 MWe Reactor is easy to safeguard thanks 
to the item accounting that can be conducted.  Any missing rods are easy to notice, and a 
single rod will not provide enough material for a proliferator to fashion into a weapon.  
The Radiochemical Laboratory has several proliferation pathways, but is still fairly easy 
to safeguard because of the relatively low amounts of plutonium passing through the 
facility at any one time.  Finally, an uncertainty analysis of the measurement systems 
was conducted.  Each measurement has an uncertainty associated with it, and that 
uncertainty leads to MUF.  By ensuring that the σMUF is below one third of the 
significant quantity of the material in question, there can be confidence in the integrity of 
the safeguards system.  For the Fuel Fabrication Facility, the MBP can be as long as 365 
days at its current capacity or as small as 14 days if the capacity is made larger to 
support a potential 200 MWe Reactor.  The amount of material is vastly different for the 
two capacities, which is the cause of the different MBP‟s.  The 5 MWe Reactor does not 
have an MBP due to containment and surveillance of the fuel rods.  As long as each fuel 
rod is accounted for, it is unlikely for any material to be diverted.  The Radiochemical 
Laboratory must have an MBP of no longer than 30 days.    
 Fuel cycles that feature small graphite-moderated and gas-cooled reactors are 
capable of implementing safeguards that meet the timeliness goals set by the IAEA with 
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minimal cost and minimal impact on facility operations.  The test case shows that former 
weapons programs can also be adapted to suit the needs of a safeguards regime.  Thus, 
any rejection of safeguards implementation by a state with this set of facilities suggests 
that this state has ulterior or nefarious motives.    
 This research also explicitly shows that it is possible to safeguard graphite 
moderated reactors and associated fuel cycle facilities and that the process is also very 
straightforward and similar to the process for LWR‟s.  Specifically, the current fuel 
cycle present in the DPRK can also be safeguarded with minimal impact to the 
legitimate purposes of the fuel cycle.  As has been shown, the front end of the fuel cycle 
can have a much higher capacity and still meet the goals set forth by the IAEA.  The 
Radiochemical Laboratory is also capable of an increase in capacity without negatively 
affecting the facilities operation.  Therefore, a larger reactor or additional reactors could 
also be included in this safeguards approach with only slight modification of the 
proposed system.  The rejection of safeguards implementation for similar facilities 
would imply something about that state‟s intentions for the fuel cycle, and could be used 
to make a case for noncompliance with the NPT. 
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APPENDIX A 
TransLAT INPUT DECK WITH CONTROL ROD MATERIAL PRESENT 
 
TTL DPRK 5MWe fuel pin cell 
con:0 
TRP:D MOCS2D /  
TRP:N MOCS2D / 
TRP:G OFF 
! Operating state 
SYS PD=0.4 TF=900.0 TC=620.0 TM=600.0 TG=573.0 PR=2000 
DOP On 
! Mat Data 
MAT:FUEL 18.9 92234=0.0054725 92235=0.7164 92238=98.7781275 13000=0.5  
TAVE=TF MATTYP=1 ICHN=92/ 
MAT:CLAD 1.738 40000=0.5 13000=99.5 TAVE=TC MATTYP=0/ 
MAT:GRPH 1.2 6012=100 5000=7.5E-6 26000=309.9E-4 TAVE=TM MATTYP=0/ 
MAT:COOL 0 6012=7.69E-5 8016=1.54E-4 TAVE=TG MATTYP=0/ 
MAT:CAP  0 13000=0.0215 6012=3.84E-5 8016=7.69E-5 TAVE=TC MATTYP=0/ 
MAT:CTRL 2.52 5000=80 6012=20 TAVE=TG MATTYP=0/ 
!-Fuel Pieces 
GEO:1 
'REG',40/ 
  'RPP','GRPH',1,1,10.0/ 
  'RCC','GRPH',1,1,4.25/ 
  'RCC','GRPH',1,1,3.9/ 
  'RCC','GRPH',1,1,3.7/ 
  'RCC','GRPH',1,1,3.6/ 
  'RCC','GRPH',1,1,3.5/ 
  'RCC','COOL',1,1,3.25/ 
  'RCC','CAP',1,1,2.5/ 
  'RCC','CLAD',1,1,1.5/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.45/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.445/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.44/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.435/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.43/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.425/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.42/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.415/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.41/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.405/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.40/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.39/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.38/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.37/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.36/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.35/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.325/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.30/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.25/ 
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  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.20/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.15 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.10/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.05/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.00/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,0.90/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,0.80 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,0.70/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,0.60/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,0.50/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,0.40/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,0.30/ 
'CTRLF',40/ 
  'RPP','GRPH',1,1,4.5/ 
  'RCC','GRPH',1,1,4.25/ 
  'RCC','GRPH',1,1,3.9/ 
  'RCC','GRPH',1,1,3.7/ 
  'RCC','GRPH',1,1,3.6/ 
  'RCC','GRPH',1,1,3.5/ 
  'RCC','COOL',1,1,3.25/ 
  'RCC','CAP',1,1,2.5/ 
  'RCC','CLAD',1,1,1.5/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.45/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.445/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.44/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.435/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.43/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.425/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.42/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.415/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.41/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.405/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.40/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.39/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.38/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.37/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.36/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.35/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.325/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.30/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.25/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.20/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.15/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.10/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.05/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,1.00/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,0.90/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,0.80/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,0.70/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,0.60/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,0.50/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,0.40/ 
  'RCC','FUEL',1,1,0.30/ 
'CTRLR',2,0,1,0,1,0/ 
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  'RPP','GRPH',1,1,5.5/ 
  'RCC','COOL',1,1,3.25/ 
/ 
!-Graphite Blocks 
GEO:41 
  'Long','GRPH',14.5,5.5/ 
  'NS','GRPH',5.5,14.5/ 
  'Short','GRPH',5.5,9.0/ 
/ 
LAT 
+REG:1-12/ 
 4*0.0  20,3*0.0  0.0,20,2*0.0  40,3*0.0  60,3*0.0  0.0,40,2*0.0  
0.0,60,2*0.0  20,60,2*0.0  40,60,2*0.0  60,20,2*0.0 60,40,2*0.0  
60,60,2*0.0/ 
+CTRLF:1-4/ 
 20,20,2*0.0  40,20,2*0.0  20,40,2*0.0  40,40,2*0.0/ 
+CTRLR:1/ 
 30,30,0.0,0.0/ 
+Long:1-8/ 
 15.5,10,2*0.0  30,10,2*0.0  10,24.5,2*0.0  35.5,24.5,2*0.0  
10,30,2*0.0  35.5,30,2*0.0  15.5,44.5,2*0.0  30,44.5,2*0.0/ 
+NS:1-4/ 
 10,10,2*0.0  44.5,10,2*0.0  10,35.5,2*0.0  44.5,35.5,2*0.0/ 
+Short:1-4/ 
 24.5,15.5,2*0.0  24.5,35.5,2*0.0  30,15.5,2*0.0  30,35.5,2*0.0/ 
/ 
! Print 
PRI 
 1/ 
 20,2,1,1,1,1/ 
 30,1/ 
/ 
BUR 
1,2,3,4,4.5,4.8,4.81,4.82,4.83,4.84,4.85,4.86,4.87 / 
! MCNP 
TRA 
 1,1,1000,5 2000,1.3, '5mwe', '/packages/translat/tfx/tramcnp_vi.dat'/ 
! 
STA 
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APPENDIX B 
MAPLE WORKSHEET USED TO FIND POWER PROFILE 
 
> sigmaa1c:=7.83606E-4;sigmaa2c:=2.40453E-
3;sigmaa1r:=1.16939E-3;sigmaa2r:=3.0463E-
3;sigmatr1r:=2.34276E-1;sigmatr2r:=1.544E-
1;sigmatr1c:=2.31652E-1;sigmatr2c:=1.52268E-
1;nusigf1c:=4.10675E-4;nusigf2c:=2.84748E-
3;nusigf1r:=4.07371E-4;nusigf2r:=2.85055E-
3;d1c:=1/(3*sigmatr1c);d2c:=1/(3*sigmatr2c);d1r:=1/(3*sigma
tr1r);d2r:=1/(3*sigmatr2r);Bm11:=(nusigf1c-
sigmaa1c)/d1c;Bm21:=(nusigf2c-
sigmaa2c)/d2c;Bm12:=(nusigf1r-
sigmaa1r)/d1r;Bm22:=(nusigf2r-
sigmaa2r)/d2r;sigmar1c:=2.42349E-3;sigmas1t2c:=2.42349E-3-
7.83606E-4;sigmar1r:=2.41823E-3;sigmas1t2r:=2.41823E-3-
1.16939E-3;sigf2c:=1.16922E-3;sigf1c:=1.56738E-
4;sigf1r:=1.55613E-4;sigf2r:=1.17048E-3; 
> L:=590;a:=30; 
> c11:=sigmar1c-
nusigf1c;c12:=1/nusigf2c;c13:=c11/d1c+sigmaa2c/d2c;c14:=(si
gmas1t2c-sigmaa2c*c11*c12)/(d1c*d2c*c12); 
> mu21:=(1/2)*(-
c13+(c13^2+4*c14)^(1/2));lambda21:=(1/2)*(c13+(c13^2+4*c14)
^(1/2)); 
> 
c15:=sigmas1t2c/(d2c*mu21+sigmaa2c);c16:=sigmas1t2c/(sigmaa
2c-d2c*lambda21); 
> phi1c:=x-
>A*cos(sqrt(mu21)*x)+C*cosh(sqrt(lambda21)*x);phi2c:=x-
>A*c15*cos(sqrt(mu21)*x)+C*c16*cosh(sqrt(lambda21)*x); 
> c21:=sigmar1r-
nusigf1r;c22:=1/nusigf2r;c23:=c21/d1r+sigmaa2r/d2r;c24:=(si
gmas1t2r-sigmaa2r*c21*c22)/(d1r*d2r*c22); 
> mu22:=(1/2)*(-
c23+(c23^2+4*c24)^(1/2));lambda22:=(1/2)*(c23+(c23^2+4*c24)
^(1/2)); 
> 
c25:=sigmas1t2r/(d2r*mu22+sigmaa2r);c26:=sigmas1t2r/(sigmaa
2r-d2r*lambda22); 
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> phi1r:=x-
>E*cos(sqrt(mu22)*x)+G*cosh(sqrt(lambda22)*x);phi2r:=x-
>E*c25*cos(sqrt(mu22)*x)+G*c26*cosh(sqrt(lambda22)*x); 
> eq1:=phi1c(-L/2-2*d1c)=0;eq2:=phi2c(-L/2-
2*d2c)=0;eq3:=phi1r(L/2+2*d1r)=0;eq4:=phi2r(L/2+2*d2r)=0; 
> phi1c(x)>0;phi2c(x)>0;phi1r(x)>0;phi2r(x)>0; 
> eq5:=phi1c(a)=phi1r(a);eq6:=phi2c(a)=phi2r(a); 
> dphi1c:=x->-
A*sqrt(mu21)*sin(sqrt(mu21)*x)+C*sqrt(lambda21)*sinh(sqrt(l
ambda21)*x);dphi2c:=x->-
A*c15*sqrt(mu21)*sin(sqrt(mu21)*x)+C*c16*sqrt(lambda21)*cos
h(sqrt(lambda21)*x);dphi1r:=x->-
E*sqrt(mu22)*sin(sqrt(mu22)*x)+G*sqrt(lambda22)*sinh(sqrt(l
ambda22)*x);dphi2r:=x->-
E*c25*sqrt(mu22)*sin(sqrt(mu22)*x)+G*c26*sqrt(lambda22)*sin
h(sqrt(lambda22)*x); 
> eq7:=-d1c*dphi1c(a)=-d1r*dphi1r(a);eq8:=-d2c*dphi2c(a)=-
d2r*dphi2r(a); 
> solve({eq6,eq7,eq8},{C,E,G}); 
> G:=-1.527758747*A;C:=-1.431608855*A;E:=0.9648199562*A; 
> Ef:=3.2043545999999996E-17;Pf:=20; 
> eq9:=Pf=int(Ef*(sigf1c*phi1c(x)+sigf2c*phi2c(x)),x=-
L/2..a)+int(Ef*(sigf1r(x)*phi1r(x)+sigf2r*phi2r(x)),x=a..L/
2); 
> solve(eq9,A); 
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